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IN DEFENSE OF CORPORATE PERSONS*
Kent Greenfield**
Corporate personhood is getting a bad name.
Following the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Citizens United
1
v. Federal Election Commission protecting the First Amendment
rights of corporations to spend money in elections, the nation has
seen two trends of interest. First, we are experiencing an
explosion in the amount of outside spending in elections, with socalled “independent” expenditures in elections going up
significantly—from less than $150 million in the 2008 election
2
cycle to over $1 billion in 2012. Even greater increases appear on
3
the horizon. Second, we have seen the development of a broadgauged movement to overturn the decision by way of
constitutional amendment. These proposals range from relatively
limited and contained grants of Congressional authority to
regulate campaign finance to broad attacks on what proponents
4
call corporate “personhood.”
* The author thanks John Coates, John Bonifaz, Jeff Clements, Ron Fein, and the
other organizers of the November 2014 conference sponsored by Free Speech for People
at Harvard Law School. Thanks also to Hannah Marie Farhan for excellent research
assistance, and to Garrett Epps and Adam Winkler for thoughtful comments and
suggestions. This essay was supported by the Dean’s Research Fund at Boston College
Law School. © Kent Greenfield 2015.
** Professor of Law and Dean’s Research Scholar, Boston College Law School.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015).
3. Nicolas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par
With Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html;
Matea Gold, Koch-backed network aims to spend nearly $1 billion in run-up to 2016,
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kochbacked-network-aims-to-spend-nearly-1-billion-on-2016-elections/2015/01/26/77a44654a513-11e4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story.html; Rich Lowry, The Kochs Ride Again, POLITICO
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/koch-brothers-2016114704.html#.VOwzNClN3zI; Kenneth P. Vogel, The Kochs put a price of 2016: $889
million, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/koch-2016spending-goal-114604.html.
4. For a chart outlining the range of different proposals in the 113th Congress, see
Our Comparative Analysis of Amendment Bills in the 113th Congress, FREE SPEECH FOR
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While there is honest disagreement about the causal
relationship between the Court’s decision in Citizen United and
5
the increase in independent expenditures, there is no dispute
about the causal link between Citizens United and the increased
political focus on corporate personhood. President Obama
criticized the decision in his 2010 State of the Union address, with
members of the Court looking on, and continued the critique
during his 2012 reelection campaign. After Mitt Romney served
up the issue by asserting on the stump that “Corporations are
people, my friend,” Obama responded by declaring “I don’t care
how many times you try to explain it, corporations aren’t people.
People are people.” During the 2014 mid-terms, Sen. Elizabeth
Warren kept the issue fresh as she barnstormed the country to
rally the faithful. According to the Washington Post, her most
dependable applause line in her stump speech was “Corporations
6
are not people!”
The opposition to corporate personhood has not just been
the stuff of speeches. A number of advocacy groups have either
sprung up to fight corporate personhood or rebranded themselves
by newly taking aim at it. Most of these groups oppose the right
of corporations to assert any First Amendment speech rights, and
some have gone further, calling for disabusing all corporations or
businesses of any constitutional right. Common Cause, for
example, uses former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich to tout its
support for “a constitutional amendment declaring that ‘Only
PEOPLE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://freespeechforpeople.org/node/593. More recently, more
than 100 Senators and Representatives introduced a proposed 28th Amendment in the
114th Congress. This amendment, called the “Democracy for All Amendment,” gives
Congress and the states power to enact limits on the “raising and spending of money . . .
to influence elections,” and gives them power to “distinguish between natural persons and
corporations” even as to “prohibit[] such entities from spending money to influence
elections.” See 28th Amendment Introduced in Congress With More Than 100 Sponsors,
CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://corporationsarenotpeople.com
/2015/01/22/28th-amendment-introduced-in-congress-with-more-than-100-sponsors/.
5. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATION (forthcoming 2016); Matt Bai, How
Did Political Money Get Lost?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22, 2012 at MM14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changedthe-political-game.html?pagewanted=all; Richard L. Hasen, How ‘The Next Citizens
United’ Could Bring More Corruption – but less gridlock,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2014,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-the-next-citizens-united-couldbring-more-corruption--but-less-gridlock/2014/02/21/a190d1c6-95ab-11e3-afce-3e7c922
ef31e_story.html; Rick Hasen, What Matt Bai’s Missing in His Analysis of Whether Citizens
United is Responsible for the Big Money Explosion, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 18, 2012,
10:41 am), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=37108 .
6. David A. Fahrenthold, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, The Teacher, Reminds Democrats
That ‘Rally’ Is A Verb, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/sen-elizabeth-warren-has-become-a-master-of-the-stump-speech/2014/10/28
/acfee026-5e0e-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_story.html.
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People are People’ and that only people should have free speech
7
rights protected by the Constitution.” Public Citizen, the liberal
litigation group founded by Ralph Nader, argues that “rights
8
protected by the Constitution were intended for natural people.”
Free Speech for People, one of the groups most influential in the
anti-personhood movement, is pushing a “People’s Rights
Amendment” (the “PRA”) declaring that “the rights protected
9
by this Constitution” are “the rights of natural persons.” Under
the PRA, “corporate entities” would be “subject to regulations as
the people . . . deem reasonable.” Corporations, that is, would not
10
be able to claim any constitutional right. A version of the PRA
was sponsored in the last Congress by Senator Jon Tester of
Montana and Congressman Jim McGovern of Massachusetts. It
would declare that “the rights protected by this Constitution” are
“the rights of natural persons.” By their count, sixteen states and
nearly 600 localities have endorsed some kind of anti-personhood
11
amendment. Moreover, the movement against corporate
personhood has benefitted from the intellectual heft offered by a
number of prominent legal scholars, including several speaking at

7. COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/issues/money-in-politics/index
.jsp?page=2 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); Robert Reich, Robert Reich: Amend 2012,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eg3-yrZnxe0.
8. A Constitutional Amendment to Keep Corporate Money Out of Elections:
Corporations Are Not People, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/documents/DIFPCorporations-are-Not-People-Citizens-United-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
9. The People’s Rights Amendment, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://www.
freespeechforpeople.org/node/527 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). The text of the proposed
amendment is as follows:
Section 1. We the people who ordain and establish this Constitution intend the
rights protected by this Constitution to be the rights of natural persons.
Section 2. People, person, or persons as used in this Constitution does not include
corporations, limited liability companies or other corporate entities established
by the laws of any state, the United States, or any foreign state, and such
corporate entities are subject to such regulations as the people, through their
elected state and federal representatives, deem reasonable and are otherwise
consistent with the powers of Congress and the States under this Constitution.
Section 3. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the people’s rights
of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion, and such
other rights of the people, which rights are inalienable.
10. More precisely, any claim of constitutional right by a corporation, would receive
rational basis review, the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Williamson v Lee
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (“The law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that he particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it.”).
11. Elections Show Americans Ready to Amend the Constitution (Press Release),
MOVE TO AMEND (Nov. 5, 2014), available at https://movetoamend.org/press-release/
election-shows-americans-ready-amend-constitution.
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the conference that engendered this series of essays. 12 In a
moment when the progressive left seems listless, this movement
has genuine energy.
This essay is a critique of this attack on corporate
personhood. I will explain that the corporate separateness—
corporate “personhood”—is an important legal principle as a
matter of corporate law. What’s more, as a matter of
constitutional law, corporate “personhood” deserves a more
nuanced analysis than has been typically offered in arguing in
favor of an amendment to overturn Citizens United. Indeed, the
concept of corporate “personhood” can in fact be marshaled in
arguments against corporations being able to assert constitutional
rights. In the nascent category of cases brought by corporations
asserting rights of religious freedom, for example, corporations
typically derivatively assert the religious claims of their
shareholders. Attention to corporate “personhood” would lead
courts to separate the claims of shareholders from those of the
corporation itself, leading to a dismissal of corporate religious
claims asserted on behalf of shareholders.
Finally, I will propose that the concerns motivating the
movement against corporate personhood should be ameliorated
with adjustments in corporate governance rather than
constitutional law. In corporate law, what we need are changes in
corporate governance to make corporations more like persons,
not less. Unlike persons, corporations are expected to act if they
have only one goal—the production of shareholder value. People
must balance a range of obligations, both moral and legal.
Requiring corporations to attend to a broader range of
stakeholders would make corporations more like people, would
make them better citizens, and would make their political
participation less problematic.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SEPARATENESS
In 2014, the Court heard arguments in Burwell v. Hobby
13
Lobby, a case contesting the so-called “contraceptive mandate”
in the Affordable Care Act. As enacted, the Affordable Care Act
contained a provision requiring companies over a certain size to
provide its employees with health insurance that includes all

12. Legal Advisory Committee, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://freespeechfor
people.org/node/597 (last visited May 1, 2015).
13. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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medically approved forms of contraceptive care. 14 Hobby Lobby
sued, saying that the provision operated as a violation of the
15
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which provides
that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive
16
means to further a compelling governmental purpose. Hobby
Lobby argued that under traditional canons of statutory
17
construction and under the Dictionary Act, it should be
18
considered a “person” under RFRA. While the case was limited
to the statutory question, it presaged religious exercise cases
certainly to be brought by corporations in the future.
An arts and crafts retailer, Hobby Lobby is a big company,
with over 20,000 employees and more than 600 stores. But it’s
closely held, with all its stock owned by members of one family—
the Greens of Oklahoma City—who are devout Christians. The
Greens believe that four of the methods covered by the
contraceptive mandate of the ACA are “abortifacients,” and
argued that the mandate caused them to violate their genuinely
held belief that human life begins at conception. At first glance,
the Greens’ arguments appear to depend on corporate
personhood. Indeed, they argued that Hobby Lobby deserved to
be considered a person under RFRA.
Nevertheless, as a group of corporate law professors argued
in an amicus brief, a crucial aspect of Hobby Lobby’s argument
turned on a rejection of corporate personhood. (I helped write the
19
brief and was a signatory. ) The brief explained that “corporate
personhood” simply expresses the idea that the corporation has a
legal identity separate from its shareholders, employees, and
other constituents. That separateness, the brief pointed out, is
inherent in what it means to be a corporation. A “first principle”
of corporate law is that “for-profit corporations are entities that
possess legal interests and a legal identity of their own—one
separate and distinct from their shareholders.” The very purpose

seq.

14.
15.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et

16. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a) and (b).
17. 1. U.S.C. 1.
18. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–70.
19. The brief was filed on behalf of a group of forty-four law professors. The lead
author of the brief was Jayne Barnard, James Goold Cutler Professor of Law at William
and Mary. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of
Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (10th Cir. argued June 27,
2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_
court_preview/briefs-v3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf.
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of the corporation as a legal form is to create an entity “distinct in
its legal interests and existence from those who contribute capital
to it.”
This separateness means, among other things, that
shareholders are not held liable for the debts of the corporation.
That makes it possible for people to invest in corporate stock
without overseeing the day-to-day activities of companies in
which they invest and without risking every penny they own in
case the corporation goes bankrupt. This separateness thus makes
capital markets possible. And capital markets are essential for the
development of a vibrant national economy. Separateness also
means that corporations can exist long after the life of any
individual that invests in, or works for, them. As Lynn Stout has
pointed out, corporations in this way provide a mechanism for
society to make long-term, intergenerational investments that are
20
not linked to government or a specific family. In this light, it is
not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been
one of the legal innovations most important to the development
of national wealth.
The professors argued that separateness meant the Greens
should not be able to attach their own religious beliefs to the
corporation. The reason the Greens had chosen to form a
corporation was to be able to operate the business without
running the risk of losing their personal assets if the corporation
went belly up. For purposes of liability, the Greens wanted
separateness; they wanted “personhood” for the corporation.
They should not then be able to stand in the shoes of the
corporation for purposes of religion. The Greens’ argument was
cursed with an internal inconsistency: to be a religious “person”
with religious beliefs cognizable under RFRA, the company had
to borrow the religious beliefs of the Greens. That is, to disregard
the company’s personhood.
The Supreme Court did not notice the inconsistency. It held,
5–4, that the Greens could project their religious beliefs onto the
corporation and refuse to provide their employees the required
contraceptive-care benefits. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion is
evidence of the Court’s much-discussed pro-business tilt, to be
21
sure. But it is also evidence that the Court did not understand
20. Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015).
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 172–84
(2014); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013); Paul Barrett & Greg Stohr, Supreme Court
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the basics of corporate law. Its mistake was not an embrace of
corporate personhood but a rejection of it.
An additional aspect of corporate personhood is to create a
mechanism in law to hold corporations accountable. Consider the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster. For three months in 2010,
Americans woke to the news of another 50,000 barrels of crude
22
oil spewing into the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico. We
were justifiably outraged. In a legal system without corporate
personhood, the channel for that outrage would be limited to
lawsuits and criminal inquiries against individual human beings
responsible—managers, workers, and contractors. That is
important, of course. In any legal jurisdiction worth its salt, the
search for culpable individuals has to be part of the settling-up of
any man-made disaster. But it should not be all. Few human
beings would have enough money to compensate those harmed
by such a massive disaster. Because a corporate entity is also on
the hook, there’s a chance for something approaching real
compensation or real responsibility. Corporate personhood is
thus not only a mechanism for the creation of wealth (by
encouraging investment), it is a mechanism for enforcing
accountability (by providing a deep pocket to sue).
All this is to say that the political rhetoric of “corporations
are not people” is just that, and should not be used to guide our
legal analysis. Corporate separateness is a crucial analytical tool
in corporate law, both in encouraging investment and providing
accountability. A corporation may have “no soul to be damned
23
and no body to be kicked,” but corporate personhood is a
valuable legal fiction that should not be jettisoned.
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
A NULL SET?
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the movement against
“corporate personhood” do not spend much time talking about
Shields Corporations From Liability Risks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, June 27, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-27/supreme-court-shields-corporationsfrom-liability-risks; Adam Liptak, Friend of the Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013, at
BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-aredefining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all.
22. On Scene Coordinator Report, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 33 (Sep. 2011), U.S.
COAST GUARD, available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf.
23. Attributed to Edward Thurlow, 1st Baron Thurlow, who was Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain from 1778 to 1783. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386 (1981).
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these corporate law aspects of the concept. Though their
arguments with regard to constitutional standing are inconsistent
with these longstanding corporate notions, they do not appear to
advocate for an eradication of corporate personhood in the sense
of having a capacity to sue and be sued, to hold property, or to
borrow money or issue stock in its own name.
Instead, the cries of “corporations are not people” are usually
meant as a placeholder for the assertion that corporations should
not be able to claim the constitutional rights that human beings
can. The question of corporate constitutional rights has been a
matter of Supreme Court analysis for nearly 200 years, ever since
24
the 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
The question of which rights corporations should be able to claim
does not have an easy answer.
But one piece of analysis is indeed easy: the argument that
corporations should not have standing to assert any constitutional
25
right is quite weak indeed. Remember, the opposite of a
constitutional right is a government power. If corporations have
no rights, then governmental power in connection with
corporations is at its maximum. That power can be abused, and
corporate personhood is a necessary bulwark. A handful of
examples illustrate the point.
In 1971, the government sought to stop the New York Times,
a for-profit, publicly-traded media conglomerate, and the
Washington Post, which had gone public as a corporation only a
few weeks previously, from publishing the leaked Pentagon
Papers. In one of the most important free speech rulings of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court correctly decided that the
26
papers had a First Amendment right to publish. At the time, no
one seriously suggested that the correct answer to the
constitutional question was that the Times and the Post, as
corporations, had no standing to bring a constitutional claim at all.
In 1992, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v Wade in a
hard-fought case in which the right to choose was championed by
27
plaintiff Planned Parenthood, a corporation. No one seriously
suggested the organization had no standing to object to limits on
its ability to provide abortions because of its status as a corporate
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
25. For an excellent analysis, see Brandon Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (2014).
26. N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
27. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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entity. Today, Google and other media companies are fighting
28
government demands to disgorge the contents of their servers.
No one seriously suggests that the government’s power should be
unchecked because the media companies, as corporations, have
no Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures. If corporations were not able to claim the Fifth
Amendment rights to be free of government takings, their assets
and resources would always be at risk of expropriation. No one
would invest in corporations, undermining the reason we have
them in the first place.
In fact, some of the leading opponents of corporate
“personhood” have begun to concede the weakness of the
argument that corporations should never be able to assert any
constitutional right. For example, a recent update to the website
of Free Speech for People seeks to reassure supporters that its
advocacy of the People’s Rights Amendment would not affect the
freedom of the press, even though its text purports to end all
29
constitutional rights for corporations. The update argues that
press freedoms would still be held by the individual human beings
engaging in press activities, even when those individuals operate
in a corporate form. According to this update, “The freedom of
press applies to press/media functions regardless of whether a
30
corporation owns and operates those functions.”
This interpretation of the PRA by its own authors embodies
what appears to be a striking concession that the corporate form
is immaterial to the analysis of speech or press freedoms. What
apparently counts is the function at issue, not the status of the
claimant. If a law or government actor infringes on the function
of the press, then it will be subject to constitutional scrutiny,
“regardless of whether a corporation owns and operates those
functions.” In other words, corporate personhood is immaterial to
28. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc. and Accenture PLC in support of
Appellant, Microsoft Co. v. U.S., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/15/amazon_microsoft_ireland_amicus_brief.pdf; Brief of
Verizon Communications, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Ebay Inc.,
Salesforce.com, Inc. and Infor, as Amici Curiae in support of Appellant, Microsoft Co. v.
U.S., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. 2014), available at http://publicpolicy.verizon.com
/assets/images/content/Amicus_Brief_in_Microsoft_Search_Warrant_Case.pdf;
Kim
Zetter, Tech Giants Rally Around Microsoft to Protect Your Data Overseas, WIRED, Dec.
15, 2014, available at http://www.wired.com/2014/12/microsoft-allies-fight-for-overseasdata-privacy/.
29. See supra at note 9.
30. The People’s Rights Amendment Protects Freedom of the Press, FREE SPEECH
FOR PEOPLE, http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/FSFP%20on%20freedom
%20of%20the%20press.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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the constitutional question, and a corporation can assert the
constitutional right of freedom of the press if it “owns and
operates those functions.” This reassurance is flatly inconsistent
with the Amendment’s proposed language that “corporate
entities are subject to such regulations as the people, through their
elected state and federal representatives, deem reasonable.” That
language would allow a reasonable regulation of corporateowned newspapers; the update backtracks significantly but does
not adjust the language of the proposed amendment. Is it that the
Amendment’s ban on corporate rights is not meant to apply when
the corporation’s assertion of rights is to the benefit of natural
persons? If so, when is that not the case? Remember that in
Citizens United itself, the non-profit corporate claimant was
asserting a First Amendment right to speak on behalf of, and to,
natural persons. If the Amendment includes an implicit exception
when a corporation is acting on behalf of or for the benefit of
natural persons, then the People’s Rights Amendment would not
change the outcome in the very case that motivated it.
The Amendment does include a provision that “Nothing
contained herein shall be construed to limit the people’s rights of
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, free exercise of religion,
and such other rights of the people, which rights are inalienable.”
But that provision focuses on rights of people. If it operates as a
savings clause for corporate rights of speech, press, and religion,
then the amendment is toothless indeed and would not overturn
the result in Citizens United itself.
A second update purports to explain that the People’s Rights
Amendment is not open to the criticism that it subjects
31
corporations to uncompensated takings, as I argue above. The
update explains that “While corporations are not among ‘we the
people’ by and for whom the Constitution exists, corporations and
other property are nonetheless secure from unconstitutional
conduct by government.” This explanation is hard to decipher,
since it is a logical impossibility for an entity to not have rights but
nevertheless be “secure from unconstitutional conduct by the
government.” Having a right is simply another way of saying that
one is protected from unconstitutional acts; not having a right is
merely another way of saying that there is no constitutional limit
on government conduct toward you. So it cannot be the case that
31. The People’s Rights Amendment Protects Property Rights, FREE SPEECH FOR
PEOPLE, http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/FSFP%20on%20property%20
rights.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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corporations do not have rights but are still able to claim the
government has acted unconstitutionally toward them.
Perhaps this update should be taken to be saying something
about the rights of shareholders, assumed to be those who “own”
32
corporations (a highly contestable claim, by the way ). One way
to understand the update is to see it as positing a right held by
shareholders to assert a constitutional claim any time a
corporation’s property is taken. Let us call this “property
standing.” Or the update could mean that the corporation can
derivatively assert the interests of its shareholders. Let us call this
“derivative standing.”
The update indeed seems to suggest that the PRA would
allow both property and derivative standing. As for property
standing, the update asserts that “human beings who have had
their property taken . . . (including the shares held by people in
the corporation) may invoke remedies under the 5th or 14th
Amendment.” As for derivative standing, the update asserts,
“The corporation may also have standing to bring those
arguments on behalf of their shareholders.”
As with the update on press freedoms, these arguments are
inconsistent with the text of the proposed amendment and with
the claim that corporations should have no constitutional rights.
These exceptions are in fact so broad that they would swallow the
rule. If, for example, shareholders can assert that limits on
corporate activities causing financial harm to them give them an
independent constitutional claim, then limits on corporate speech
would often affect shareholder returns as clearly as limits on other
aspects of corporate behavior. As a matter of “property standing”
there is no conceptual difference between a limit on corporate
speech that decreases shareholder value and a taking of corporate
property that decreases shareholder value. One cannot explain
the difference by saying that corporations have no speech rights
and do have property rights, because under the PRA they would
have neither. So under the update, shareholders could sue to
contest constraints on corporations that cause shareholders
financial harm, which could include limits on corporate speech.
Under this reasoning, the only effect of the PRA would be that
instead of corporations bringing First Amendment challenges it
would be the shareholders of those corporations bringing the
challenges. The years of effort fighting for a 28th Amendment
32. Kent Greenfield, Are Shareholders Owners? Absolutely. And Absolutely Not, 66
J. GOVERNANCE DIRECTIONS 479 (2014).
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would result in the same claims being brought and argued, but on
behalf of shareholders as plaintiffs instead of the corporation
itself.
Another oddity created by the supposed workaround of
“property standing” is that many corporations covered by the
PRA do not have shareholders. Consider my home institution,
Boston College. Organized as a corporation, it would not be able
to claim any constitutional rights itself under the terms of the
PRA, because as a corporate entity it would be subject to “such
regulations as the people . . . deem reasonable.” And shareholders
cannot come to the rescue because Boston College has no
shareholders. This is true of all non-profits—whether hospitals,
charitable organizations, or political advocacy groups like Free
Speech for People itself. Boston College is a legal person under
Massachusetts law, but under the PRA it would have no
constitutional rights and could be subject to uncompensated
takings of its land, property, or other assets. And because it has
no shareholders, there would be no human beings who could
claim “property standing” to protect the corporation from
governmental overreach. The irony of the “property standing”
exception, then, would be that for-profit corporations would be
protected from uncompensated takings because shareholders
could raise the constitutional claims, but non-profit corporations
would not be so protected. Chevron having more rights than
Boston College surely cannot be the outcome intended by the
PRA’s advocates.
The notion of derivative standing is similarly problematic.
Note that this is the same kind of exception to the “corporations
have no rights” rule that the PRA advocates assert to save the
freedom of the press. The corporation itself has no rights, they
say, but the corporation can assert the rights of its constituents.
There are multiple problems with this work-around, however.
First, as mentioned above, many corporate entities do not have
shareholders. And many corporations have only other
corporations as shareholders. Subsidiaries, for example, are often
entirely owned by a corporate parent. I presume that under the
PRA, corporations would not “also have standing to bring
[constitutional claims] on behalf of their shareholders” if those
shareholders are also corporations. The resulting patchwork—
corporations with human shareholders could assert constitutional
rights but corporations with no shareholders or with only
institutional shareholders could not—would be awkward at best.
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Worse, the “derivative standing” argument would undermine
corporate separateness where it is most important. Remember the
Hobby Lobby case, where the Green family bristled at burdens
on their religious freedoms but used the corporation as the vessel
for their complaints. Hobby Lobby asserted, in effect, derivative
standing to bring its shareholders’ religious claims. If such
derivative standing became the norm, we would see a drastic
increase in the assertion of corporate constitutional claims for
exemptions from regulations conflicting with their shareholders’
freedoms of speech or religion, whether those regulations
33
pertained to contraceptive mandates or anti-discrimination laws.
Surely an increase in corporate constitutional claims is not an
intended outcome of the PRA. But the proposed exception
allowing corporations to assert the rights of their shareholders
could have that very effect.
The argument that corporations have no constitutional rights
is simply unsustainable. Even the most adamant opponents of
corporate constitutional rights cannot hold the line, offering up
exceptions that recognize and even expand corporate rights.
They, too, find themselves engaging in the very difficult analysis
of which rights corporations may assert and which they do not.
Their answers are problematic and inconsistent, but they
recognize the necessity of the task.
III. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SOME
BUT NOT ALL
The question of which constitutional rights corporations can
claim has bedeviled the Court and commentators for two
centuries. Of course corporations are not genuine human beings
and should not automatically receive all the constitutional rights
that human beings claim. At the same time, as argued above, it is
similarly obvious that corporations should be able to claim some
constitutional rights. So which ones, and when?
At a high level of generality, the answer to that question turns
on both the purpose of the corporate form and the nature of the
right asserted. In fact, few general statements can improve on
Chief Justice Marshall’s in Dartmouth College: “Being the mere
creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it either expressly
33. See Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby and the Return of “The Negro Travelers’
Green Book,” AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 26, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/hobby-lobbyand-return-negro-travelers-green-book.
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or as incidental to its very existence.” 34 In effect, the proper
analysis of corporate constitutional rights asks what rights are
“incidental to its very existence.” Then-Justice William
Rehnquist, dissenting in First National Bank v. Bellotti, said it
best: “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by
natural persons, . . . our inquiry must seek to determine which
35
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.’”
This inquiry must thus necessarily begin with a discussion of
what corporations are for, what purposes they serve. This in turn
draws on a broad scholarly literature, in the corporate law field
for the most part, about the purpose of the corporation. There is
much disagreement about the question of—to borrow a phrase—
36
for whom are corporate managers trustees, that is, whether
corporations should be managed primarily to serve shareholder
37
interests or to serve a more robust set of stakeholder interests.
(More on that below.) But there is indeed broad consensus that
for-profit corporations are economic entities, created for the
purpose of benefiting society by creating wealth through the
38
production of goods and services. The constitutional analysis
should begin, then, with the presumption that for-profit
corporations should receive the rights necessarily incidental to
serving that economic purpose, and should not receive those that
are not germane to that purpose. This presumption may be
overcome in specific contexts or to further other constitutional
values, but that is the starting place for analysis.
The result will be a patchwork. Corporations cannot vote or
serve on juries, for example; it does not make any sense to think
of corporations asserting those rights, both because of the nature
of the right and the nature of the corporate entity. Similarly, the
34. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
35. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145 (1932). For recent forays into this area, see Leo E. Strine, The Dangers of
Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability
Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, WAKE FOREST L. REV.
(forthcoming); U of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-08, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576389; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SJAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC (2012).
37. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) [hereinafter GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW].
38. I discuss this foundational purpose of corporations in GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 37, at 125–42.
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Court has held that corporations cannot assert the Fifth
39
Amendment right to be free of self-incrimination. The exclusion
makes sense, since corporations could otherwise evade all kinds
of disclosure obligations necessary to make markets work. It is
easy to imagine the havoc created if, for example, General Motors
had a constitutional right not to disclose safety defects in their
cars.
When the time comes, the Court should draw the same line
with regard to the freedom to exercise religion. The right is to
protect the freedom of conscience, and only actual human beings
have a conscience. There should be allowances for genuine
associations of religious people, such as churches. (In fact, the
40
Catholic Church is organized as a corporation. ) But because of
corporate separateness—that is, corporate personhood—it will be
quite difficult for business companies to show that they are
genuine associations of religious people. Moreover, when
businesses win religious exemptions from regulation, the market
is skewed in their favor and to the detriment of other market
actors. That undermines society’s economic purpose of having
41
corporations in the first place.
Should corporations be able to assert First Amendment free
speech rights? The answer depends in part on whether the
asserted right is inconsistent with corporations’ economic
purpose. Sometimes it makes little sense to protect the First
Amendment rights of corporations. Securities laws, for example,
routinely require corporations to disclose to the public their
financial wellbeing. If human beings were required to reveal
personal finances to the public, they would rightly object to the
requirement as coerced speech, subject to strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment. But corporations’ arguments along those lines
would fail, and they should. Disclosure is necessary for markets to
work. A corporate right not to disclose would undermine the
economic purpose of corporations themselves. In other words, a
right not to disclose is not “incidental” to the “very existence” of
corporations. The opposite is true. The Supreme Court agrees, in
fact. In 2011, AT&T asked that information about its finances be
excluded from Freedom of Information Act requests, because the
39. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
40. WINKLER, supra note 5, at ch. 1; John Dewey, The Historic Background of
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926).
41. Kent Greenfield, Op-Ed, Do Corporations Have Religious Liberty?, BOS.
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2014, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/02/unfairadvantage-would-spur-abuse-exempt-status/jKhgXAMJyxaiC3vjb7qGxH/story.html.
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statute has an exception for “personal privacy.” The Court
unanimously rejected this claim—and Chief Justice John Roberts
ridiculed it in his opinion. That exception, he wrote, “does not
extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it
42
personally.”
On the other hand, the best understanding of corporate
speech rights would include the ability of the corporation to speak
publicly about matters germane to its economic role. That is,
speech that is “incidental” to its very existence in the marketplace
should receive protection. This includes commercial speech at
43
least, and presumptively even that political speech concerning
44
economic matters germane to the business.
But the question of germaneness is not likely to do all the
work we need done in the free speech area. There are additional
considerations at issue because of the nature of the right.
Sometimes it is important to protect the speech rights of a
corporation not because the communication is germane to the
economic role of the business, but because of the rights of human
listeners to hear what it has to say. The rights of listeners is what
is actually at issue in many press cases, such as the Pentagon
Papers case mentioned above. But it is not limited to press cases,
and in fact has often been used by the Court to explain
commercial speech cases. On occasion, what a corporation says is
45
relevant to public debate, or necessary to give customers the
information required for them to make decisions in the
marketplace.
It is worth pausing to recall that the idea that listeners have a
right to hear the words of businesses began as a liberal idea. In the
42. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011).
43. This statement is subject to the straightforward caveat that commercial speech
should not receive protection that is so great so as to undermine the economic role of
corporations. For example, fraud and misrepresentation—even if protected in other
speech contexts—need not be protected in commercial speech. See United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In other words, intermediate scrutiny—current doctrine—
is about right for commercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Svc.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
44. For purposes of comparison, germaneness is a matter of constitutional
importance in construing the rights of unions and union members. Under Abood v. Detroit
Bd of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977), public employees have a First Amendment right
not to have their union dues or fees used by the union for “the advancement of ideological
causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative.”
45. The recent efforts on the part of corporations to block or limit “religious
freedom” laws that could give businesses the right to discriminate against LGBTQ
customers is an example. See, e.g., Nick Gass, Wal-Mart Slams Arkansas “Religious
Freedom” Law, POLITICO (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/arkansashutchinson-rfra-walmart-116567.html.
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1970s, Ralph Nader’s group Public Citizen brought a First
Amendment challenge to limits on the commercial advertising of
46
pharmacies. They argued these laws violated the public’s right to
know. As Adam Winkler argues, it is not unfair to say that Public
Citizen’s advocacy led directly to Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in
Citizens United, in which he rested his protection of corporate
speech rights not on corporate “personhood” but on the right of
47
the public to know corporations’ views. Public Citizen may now
decry corporate constitutional rights, but its work forty years ago
helped get us to where we are today.
For constitutional questions surrounding campaign finance, I
agree with the personhood opponents that Citizens United
wrongly expanded corporate rights to spend money on elections.
I also agree that the Court’s mistake traces its origins to the 1976
case Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court struck down limits on
individual (human) campaign expenditures as violations of free
speech. But the problem in Citizens United was not the Court’s
supposed holding that corporations are people, and the problem
in Buckley was not a supposed ruling that “money is speech.”
Both are mischaracterizations, and the critical yelps they attract
are poorly targeted in any event. The Court never said in Citizens
United that corporations are people. Rather it said—incorrectly—
that corporations are “associations of citizens” and that protecting
corporate rights was necessary to protect natural persons in the
association. This is, by the way, the same mistake the PRA
advocates make in their discussion of press freedom discussed in
the previous section. As for Buckley, the Court never said money
is speech. The Court said instead that money is sometimes
essential to make speech audible above the din. Giving it, too, can
be an expressive act. Those notions are certainly correct. Imagine
if Texas told its citizens they could not contribute to Planned
Parenthood or had to pay dues to the National Rifle Association.
It would be inane to argue that the First Amendment would not
be implicated because money is not speech.
Nevertheless, there are myriad reasons why a commitment to
free speech rights—even corporate free speech rights—should not
bar reasonable limits on independent campaign expenditures
46. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
47. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–72 (2010) (stating that “[t]he purpose
and effect of this law is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit
corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public”). See WINKLER, supra
note 5.
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from both corporations and the super rich. It is not hyperbole to
say that without such limits, our democracy is at risk. The billions
of dollars flooding the electoral process skews it toward the
monied and well-heeled, and perverts the nature of public service.
The current Court is so enamored with a simplistic, libertarian
theory of free speech doctrine that it is blind to those risks. A sane
Court could easily construct exceptions to otherwise applicable
48
doctrine to protect the sanctity and fairness of our elections. In
fact, Canada’s Supreme Court has done that very thing, saying, “If
a few groups are able to flood the electoral discourse with their
message, it is possible, indeed likely, that the voices of some will
49
be drowned out.” They weighed the constitutional value of
“equality in the political discourse . . . necessary for meaningful
50
participation in the electoral process” against the value of
unfettered spending, and decided that reasonable limits on
spending was consistent with freedom of speech.
But notice something. One can support campaign finance
regulation, as the Canadian Supreme Court ruled, and still
acknowledge corporate personhood and corporate constitutional
rights as well.
The focus on corporate spending may also distract from the
fact that most of the money flooding into the electoral process is
not coming from corporations. It’s coming from rich individuals
like Sheldon Adelson and the Koch brothers. There is a lot of
corporate money, to be sure. Chevron, the most politically active
51
public corporation in 2012, spent $2.5 million in the 2012 cycle.
The Chamber of Commerce, the largest corporate bundler,
52
funneled over $35 million into various 2012 races. But both were
dwarfed by the torrent of individual money. Adelson alone threw
almost $93 million into various races during the same period, and

48. See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341 (2009).
49. Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.).
50. Id.
51. Chevron’s contributions to outside groups is listed as #23 on this chart: 2012 Top
Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org
/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=O (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
The three companies listed above them all are privately held, one by the Kochs. You can
also check the fact here: Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay
to Play: A Model Explaining Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12(2) CONN. PUB.
INT. L. J. 361, 402 (2012–2013).
52. Andrew Prokop, 40 Charts that Explain Money in Politics, VOX (July 30, 2014),
http://www.vox.com/2014/7/30/5949581/money-in-politics-charts-explain.
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the Koch brothers ran a network of shady groups that spent over
53
$400 million.
The power of corporations, to be sure, is frequently misused,
usually to the advantage of the financial and managerial elite.
Employees, communities, consumers, the environment, and the
public interest in general are often elbowed aside in corporate
decisionmaking, unless the corporation can make money by
taking them into account. Corporations are managed aggressively
to maximize shareholder return. As a result, the risks they run—
whether of oil spills in the Gulf or of financial crises erupting from
Wall Street—are often unrecognized until too late. The
executives who run American corporations do not generally think
of themselves as having obligations to the public. The social
contract of American corporations is thin.
But these defects of corporate power, fundamental as they
are, are not problems of constitutional law or corporate
personhood. They are problems of corporate law, and they could
be fixed by corporate law.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE POWER: A
CORPORATE LAW FIX
American courts forged sweeping protections for
corporations during the Gilded Age, on both the constitutional
54
and corporate fronts. Though this legal fortress was slowly
breached during the Progressive and New Deal eras, in many
ways we are back where we started. The Supreme Court over the
last decade or so has applied twisted ideas of free speech and due
55
process to wall corporations off from accountability. In
corporate governance, after a mid-century pendulum swing
toward more public-spiritedness, managers and investors are now
once again fixated on maximizing shareholder value.
In the last few years, however, there has been a pushback
against the shareholder primacy norm. An article in the Harvard
Business Review declared:
There’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that
are most successful at maximizing shareholder value over time
are those that aim toward goals other than maximizing
53. Id. at 6, 22.
54. See WINKLER, supra note 5; M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in CORP. L. STORIES 37 (J. Mark
Ramseyer, ed., 2009).
55. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 172–84.
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shareholder value. Employees and customers often know more
about and have more of a long-term commitment to a company
56
than shareholders do.

New York Times columnist Joe Nocera wrote that “it feels as
if we are at the dawn of a new movement—one aimed at
57
overturning the hegemony of shareholder value.” An opinion
piece in The Financial Times recently argued that “[c]ompanies
need a bigger and better purpose than simply maximising
58
shareholder value.” A 2011 Forbes article called shareholder
59
primacy “the dumbest idea in the world.”
The case against shareholder primacy was argued best by
Steven Pearlstein in The Washington Post. Maximizing
shareholder value, he wrote, is a “pernicious” ideology that “has
60
no foundation in history or in law.” He continued, “What began
in the 1970s and ‘80s as a useful corrective to self-satisfied
managerial mediocrity has become a corrupting, self-interested
dogma peddled by finance professors, money managers and overcompensated corporate executives.” In fact, he argued, “much of
what Americans perceive to be wrong with the economy these
days—the slow growth and rising inequality; the recurring
scandals; the wild swings from boom to bust; the inadequate
investment in R&D, worker training and public goods—has its
roots in this ideology.”
These skeptics are popularizing what a number of legal
scholars and I have been saying for quite a while—that
corporations should be seen as having robust social and public
61
obligations that cannot be encapsulated in share prices. Now,
executives have legal obligations to take account of shareholder
interests. Progressive corporate scholars argue these “fiduciary
56. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jul.–Aug. 2012, at 48, 57, available at https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders.
57. Joe Nocera, Down With Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A.19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/opinion/nocera-down-with-shareholdervalue.html?_r=0.
58. Stefan Stern, Transcend Shareholder Value for All Our Sakes, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a288288-583e-11e4-a31b-00144feab
7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Is1UZ900.
59. Steven Denning, The Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value,
FORBES Nov. 28, 2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/28/
maximizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/.
60. Steven Pearlstein, How the Cult of Shareholder Value Wrecked American
Business, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/09/how-the-cult-of-shareholder-value-wrecked-americanbusiness/.
61. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 37; STOUT,
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 36.
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duties” should be extended to employees and other corporate
62
stakeholders.
One way to make these obligations operational is to make
the decisionmaking structure of the company itself more
pluralistic. In a number of European countries, for example,
companies have “codetermined” board structures that require
63
representation of both shareholders and employees. Even with
these management structures, corporations continue their focus
on building wealth—that is the core purpose of the corporate
form—but not only for a narrow sliver of equity investors. And it
works. Germany, where co-determination is strongest, is the
economic powerhouse of Europe. The CEO of the German
company Siemens argues that codetermination is a “comparative
advantage” for Germany; the senior managing director of the U.S.
investment firm Blackstone Group had said that codetermination
was one of the factors that allowed Germany to avoid the worst
64
of the financial crisis.
Notice that these governance structures reforms make
corporations more like persons, not less. Human beings routinely
balance a multitude of interests—I am, for example, a parent, a
spouse, a teacher, a writer. Only the rare oddball behaves as if
65
accumulating money is the paramount and unitary good.
Humans have consciences; corporations do not. Left to
themselves, they will behave as if profit is the only thing that
matters. The best way to constrain corporations is to require them
to sign onto a more robust social contract and to govern
themselves more pluralistically—mechanisms designed to mimic
the traits of human personhood within the corporate form.

62. Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing: Making the Most of the “Stakeholder
Moment,” 2015 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147; Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder
Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 (2008); Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
63. ALINE CONCHON, BOARD-LEVEL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION RIGHTS IN
EUROPE: FACTS AND TRENDS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.etui.org/Publications2/
Reports/Board-level-employee-representation-rights-in-Europe; see also MAP: BoardLevel Representation in the European Economic Area, WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU,
http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Boardlevel-Representation2/MAP-Board-level-representation-in-the-European-EconomicArea2 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
64. CONCHON, supra note 63, at 8.
65. See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens
and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 799 (1997).
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If corporations had these traits of personhood, I would worry
less about corporate involvement in the political arena. American
corporations have become a vehicle for the voices and interests of
a small managerial and financial elite. The cure for this is more
democracy within businesses—more participation in corporate
governance by workers, communities, shareholders, and
consumers. If corporations were more democratic, their
participation in the nation’s political debate would be of little
concern.
Unfortunately, corporate personhood opponents are making
these corporate governance reforms less likely. Personhood
skeptics often characterize corporations as having a narrow social
role; because of that narrow role, the argument goes, they owe it
to shareholders to stay out of politics. The opponents of Citizens
United are endorsing a narrow view of business as a way to explain
why corporations should be exiled from the public square. To
fight corporate personhood, they are bolstering shareholder
primacy.
Take for instance Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in
Citizens United itself. He argued, among other things, that
corporate speech should be limited in order to protect
shareholders’ investments. Shareholders are seen as owners, as
“those who pay for an electioneering communication” and are
assumed to have “invested in the business corporation for purely
66
economic reasons.” Stevens argued that corporate political
speech did not merit protection because:
[T]he structure of a business corporation . . . draws a line
between the corporation’s economic interests and the political
preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation;
the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim
to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how
67
persuasive the arguments for a broader . . . set of priorities.

Even more revealing, Stevens cites as support a set of
corporate governance principles adopted by the prestigious
American Law Institute. The principles were the product of
compromise, both asking corporations to look after shareholder
interests and allowing them to act with an eye toward “ethical”
and “humanitarian” purposes. But Stevens quoted only the
language embodying shareholder primacy: “A corporation . . .

66.
67.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475–76 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 469–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with
68
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”
Opponents of corporate personhood are following Stevens
into the shareholder rights trap. Common Cause now has a
69
“featured campaign” for “strengthening shareholder rights.”
The Brennan Center for Justice is supporting a “shareholder
protection act” and calls shareholders “the actual owners” of
70
corporations. Professor Jamie Raskin of American University,
one of the smartest and most energetic academic opponents of
Citizens United, says that corporations should not be spending in
71
elections because, “after all, it’s [shareholders’] money.” This is
all shareholder primacy language brought to bear in fighting
Citizens United.
Wall Street loves talk of shareholder rights. To be sure, many
Americans are shareholders through our retirement accounts and
72
the like. But “widows and orphans” are still the minority; most
stock held in American businesses is owned by the very wealthy.
(The richest 5% of Americans own over 2/3 of all stock assets. The
bottom 40%—125 million working class people—essentially own
73
nothing in terms of stock. ) So when opponents of Citizens United
focus on shareholder rights, they are singing Wall Street’s tune.
I wish this shareholder-protective rhetoric was just that, but
it is not. Corporate personhood opponents urge, as an
intermediate measure short of a constitutional amendment, that
corporations be required to seek shareholder approval before
spending corporate money on political campaigns. There might be
68. Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01(a), p. 55 (1992)). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of
Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993), available at http://scholarship.
law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2024.
69. Money in Politics, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/issues/
money-in-politics/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
70. Elizabeth Kennedy, Protecting Shareholders after Citizens United, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST. (July 13, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/protectingshareholders-after-citizens-united.
71. Jamie B. Raskin, A Shareholder Solution to ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST (Oct.
3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shareholder-solution-to-citizensunited/2014/10/03/5e07c3ee-48be-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html.
72. Widow-and-Orphan Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/w/widowandorphanstock.asp (last visited May 18, 2015)
73. Wealth Groups’ Shares of Assets, by Asset Type, 2010, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug.
20, 2012), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-wealth-table-6-6-wealth-grou
ps-shares/; Wealth Groups’ Shares of Total Household Stock Wealth, 1983-2010,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/
chart/swa-wealth-figure-6g-wealth-groups-shares/.
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some benefit to such a rule, since it would help ensure executives
do not spend corporate monies on issues and candidates opposing
company interests. But that benefit is probably marginal, and
would come at the risk of validating corporate involvement in the
political process in furtherance of shareholder value and to the
detriment of other stakeholders. Corporations could speak out in
favor of Wall Street but not employees? That would be worse, not
better.
The efforts of anti-personhood activists are not only in
tension with stakeholder theory on the conceptual level. In the
political arena, too, a tension exists because the energy for reform
is a finite resource. I believe that, in this moment, there is an
opening to question the very framework of how we view
corporations and their social obligations. But we won’t get
anywhere on that front if the progressive left wastes its energy
fighting for a constitutional amendment that is unlikely to succeed
and would either be toothless or affirmatively harmful if it did.
V. CONCLUSION
There are numerous reasons to question the reasoning and
74
and a multitude of legitimate
outcome in Citizens United,
75
worries about its implications for our democracy. But the
significant efforts of activists, lawyers, and academics aimed at
ending corporate personhood are being misspent. Corporate
personhood did not drive the result in Citizens United, and it is
unclear how ending corporate personhood would change the
outcome. Indeed, an insistence on corporate personhood would
avoid results in cases such as Hobby Lobby, which depend on
courts’ willingness to ignore the separation between corporations
and their shareholders.
The worries that the deluge of independent expenditures will
pervert our democracy are legitimate, but must come to terms
with the fact that the source of the skewing at present is
predominantly that of wealthy individuals, not corporations. A
focus on corporate money in electoral politics is to fixate on what
is a relatively minor problem at worst. The question of corporate
74. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicolas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The
Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 335 (2015).
75. See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal & Ryan Grim, The Inside Story of How Citizens United
Has Changed Washington Lawmaking, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/26/citizens-united congress_n_6723540.html?ncid
=newsltushpmg00000003.
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personhood is simply immaterial to broader remedy, whether by
way of a doctrinal shift or even a constitutional amendment.
The legitimate worries about corporate power are not best
dealt with by way of constitutional amendment. Corporate power
is primarily a problem of corporate governance and regulation,
not a problem of constitutional law. Here, too, corporate
personhood should be embraced rather than shunned. Indeed, if
corporations were structured so they behave more like people, we
would have less reason to worry about their involvement in
politics.

